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Abstract: 
 This paper introduces a 
completely new approach to encryption 
based on group theoretic quantum 
framework. Quantum cryptography has 
essentially focused only on key 
distribution and proceeded with 
classical encryption algorithm with the 
generated key. Here, we present a first 
step towards a quantum encryption 
scheme based on the solution for the 
hidden subgroup problem. The shared 
secret key K from QKD evolves as a 
generator for a subgroup H of a group 
G, in combination of the plain text data 
modeled as group elements. The key K 
helps in regeneration of the plain data 
on the receiver's side based on subgroup 
reconstruction. This paper models all 
quantum computations using group 
representations. A non-constructive 
proof is attempted towards the security 
of the encryption scheme. We also 
address the issues involved in a such a 
venture into the realms of Quantum data 
encryption. 
 
Index Terms 
 Quantum Fourier Transform, 
Abelian groups, Normal subgroups, 
Soluble groups, Hidden Subgroup 
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1. Introduction 
  
           Until now, quantum cryptography 
has essentially concentrated on Quantum 
key Distribution. Many key distribution 
schemes have been proposed based on 
the BB84 protocol. This paper is an 
extension of our work in QKD, 
exploiting the randomness of 
measurement bases and key values to 
reduce unauthorized information gain by 
an eavesdropper [5] during key 
distribution. Unconditional security has 
been achieved based on the principles of 
Quantum Theory. The encryption 
algorithm used is however classical. The 
necessity for a quantum encryption 
algorithm would arise in the face of 
availability of immense computing 
power in the system which includes 
communicating parties and 
eavesdroppers. 
 This paper is probably the first 
attempt towards an encryption scheme 
exploiting quantum principles. The 
approach is based on the Hidden 
Subgroup problem. The importance of 
the Hidden Subgroup Problem [1, 2] is 
that it encompasses most of the quantum 
algorithms found so far that are 
exponentially faster than their classical 
counterparts. Research in this area is 
centered on extending the families of 
groups for which the HSP can be 
efficiently solved, which may improve 
other classically inefficient algorithms, 
such as determining graph isomorphism 
or finding the shortest vector in a lattice. 
Finally,   there are many group theoretic 
algorithms that are more efficient on a 
quantum computer, such as finding the 
order of a finite group given a set of 
generators. 
 There are lots of mathematical 
issues that need to be addressed with 
such an approach. The first consideration 
would be the dynamic construction of 
groups of abelian, non-abelian or normal 
nature. The inherent difficulty is 
modeling the key K as related to the 
generator of a subgroup. These issues 
require group theoretic explorations, 
which we have tried to present in a 
formal way. Section 2 of the paper gives 
a formal definition of the Hidden 
Subgroup Problem. The solution to the 
problem with respect to different groups 
is explored. A basic theoretical model of 
our proposal is detailed in Section 3 of 
the paper. Section 4 presents a non-
constructive proof of security. The 
subsequent sections give the 
mathematical requirements for our 
proposal.  
 
2. The Hidden Subgroup 
Problem 
   
 This section explores the 
literature for the Hidden Subgroup 
problem, in view of developing an 
equivalent quantum algorithm. We make 
a general definition of the Hidden 
Subgroup Problem, which we will 
abbreviate HSP for the rest of this paper, 
and then summarize for which groups G 
and subgroups H the HSP can be solved 
efficiently. We will also discuss partial 
results which make a general definition 
of the Hidden Subgroup Problem, which 
we will abbreviate HSP for the rest of 
this paper, and then attempt to determine 
for which groups G and subgroups H we 
can solve the HSP efficiently. We will 
also discuss partial results on groups for 
which efficient HSP algorithms are not 
known. 
 
Definition (Separates cosets). Given a 
group G, a subgroup GH ≤  and a set X, 
we say a function f: G ->X separates 
cosets of H if for all Ggg ∈21,   f (g1) = f 
(g2) if and only if g1H = g2H.  
 
Definition (The Hidden Subgroup 
Problem). Let G be a group, X a finite 
set, and f : G -> X a function such that 
there exists a subgroup H < G for which 
f separates cosets of H. Using 
information gained from evaluations of 
f, determine a generating set for H. For 
any finite group G, a classical algorithm 
can call a routine evaluating f(g) once 
for each Gg ∈  and thus determine H 
with O(|G|) function calls. A central 
challenge of quantum computing is to 
reduce this naive O(|G|) time algorithm 
to O(poly(log |G|)) time (including 
oracle calls and any needed classical 
post processing time). This can be done 
for many groups, which gives the 
exponential speedup found in most 
quantum algorithms. 
      
2.1. The Solution for the Abelian Case.  
  
 The Solution [1, 2, 6] for the 
Abelian case has an equivalent 
experimental setup.   
  
a. Prepare the state 
 
( )∑
∈Gg
gfg
G
,1  
 
and measure the second register f (g). As 
f takes distinct values on the left cosets 
of H, the resulting state is 
 
( )∑
∈Hh
chfch
H
,1  
 
where c is an element of G selected 
uniformly at random. 
 
b. Compute the Fourier transform of the  
coset  state (1), resulting in 
   
 ( )∑∑
∈∈ HhG
ch
HG
ρρ
ρ
11
 
 
where Gˆ  denotes the set of 
homomorphisms { }CG →:ρ  
 
c. Measure the first register and observe 
a homomorphism ρ  
 
A key fact about this procedure is that 
the resulting distribution over Gˆ  is 
independent of the coset cH arising after 
the first stage (as the support of the first 
register in (1)). Thus, repetitions of this 
experiment result in the same 
distribution over Gˆ   
  
 
 2.2 The Solution for the Non-Abelian 
Case. 
  
  A quantum algorithm which 
solves the hidden subgroup problem for 
the non-abelian groups [3] Wn  uses O(n) 
evaluations of the black box quantum 
circuit f and the classical post-
computation, which is essentially linear 
algebra over F2, also takes a number of 
operations which is polynomial in n. 
      
a. Prepare the ground state 
 
        0...00...01 ⊗=ψ  in both registers.    
 
b. Achieve equal amplitude distribution 
in the first register, for instance by an 
application of a Hadamard transform to 
each qubit: 
 
∑
∈
⊗=
nWx
x 0...02ψ  
(Normalization factors omitted.) 
 
c. Calculate f in superposition and 
obtain 
 
( )∑
∈
=
nWx
xfx3ψ  
 
 
d. Measure the second register and 
obtain a certain value z in the image of  
f. In the first register we have a whole 
coset g0U of the hidden subgroup U: 
 
( )
∑∑
∈=
==
UgxZxf
zxzx
0
4ψ  
 
 
e. Now solve the hidden subgroup 
problem for the normal subgroup N, 
which is the base group of Wn. This can 
be done by application of the standard 
algorithm for Z2n 2 on the first 2n qubits. 
 
f. Application of the Fourier transform 
on the first register using the circuit 
given in section 5 transforms the coset 
into a superposition of the form  
 
∑ ⊥∈Ux yg y,0ψ  
 
 in case g0  element of N (with certain 
phase factors yg ,0ψ which depend 
on g0 and y and are from {±1}). If g0  
element of Wn\N we get a superposition 
over the conjugated group   
 
∑ ⊥∈ )( ,0tUx yg yψ  
 
g. Now measure the first register. With 
probability 1/2 we draw g0 from N resp. 
Wn \N, i.e., we get a superposition over 
⊥U resp. ( )⊥tU which leads (by 
performing measurements) to either 
equal distribution over ⊥U or equal 
distribution over ( )⊥tU  
 
 
 
h. Iterating steps a-g we generate with 
high probability the group NU ∩⊥  and 
the group NU t ∩⊥)( .  
What is missing are the sets 
( ) ( )( ) '0t0 .U and . tNtNU ∩∩ ⊥⊥  
with certain elements t0 and t'0 not in N. 
It is clear that it is sufficient to find only 
one element in one of these two sets, 
since then the whole group ( )⊥⊥ tUU ,   
will be generated. But if any, there are 
many elements of this form in    
⊥U  resp. ( )⊥tU since either there are 
none of them or exactly half of the 
elements of ⊥U resp. ( )⊥tU  is not in 
NU ∩⊥ resp. NU t ∩⊥)(  
 
Summarizing: 
 After performing this experiment 
an expected number of 4n times we 
generate with probability greater than 1-
2n the group ( )⊥⊥ tUU ,  
 
i.  By solving linear equations over F2 it 
is easy to find generators for 
 
( ) tt UUUU ∩=




⊥
⊥⊥ ,  
 
After all we get generators for 
 
( )( )tUUNUU ∩∩= .  
 
3. A Basic Introduction to Group 
Theoretic Quantum Encryption  
  
 This section describes the 
theoretic model of our approach towards 
an algorithm for encryption based on 
quantum principles. The most important 
axioms of quantum theory that makes 
this approach feasible are: Quantum 
Super-position and Measurement theory. 
All quantum algorithms have essentially 
been generalized to solve pattern 
identification, referred to as the solution 
for the Hidden Subgroup problem. With 
a formal definition of HSP already 
presented, we now present the details of 
our Quantum Encryption Protocol 
(QEP).  
 The first step requires 
establishing a relation between the key K 
generated from Quantum Key 
Distribution and the generator element 
'g' of a subgroup of an arbitrary group to 
be constructed dynamically from plain 
text data (modeled as group elements).  
An efficient relation would be is to 
consider K as the generator g of the 
subgroup. This results in a complexity in 
the form of reducing all plain text 
elements to the key K. In a real time 
setup of Quantum Key Distribution, K 
may not be related to the plain text data 
at all. However, in a classical key 
distribution scheme, K can be derived 
out of the plain text to be sent, and then 
K can be communicated to the other end 
of the channel. In our proposal we model 
every data as arbitrary elements that 
given a relation form a group 
dynamically. At the initiator's side (say 
Alice), the key K, in combination with 
plain text elements, is used to construct a 
subgroup H of a group G. The entire 
group is transmitted as the cipher text. 
At the receiver's side (say Bob), the 
subgroup of plain text elements is 
reconstructed using K. 
 
 4. Non-Constructive Proof of 
Security. 
  
 Now, an essential argument lies 
in the fact that an eavesdropping strategy 
by Eve can reconstruct the subgroup 
based on the solutions to HSP on 
different groups. This requires that we 
retort to a non-constructive proof of 
security of our proposal. Later, we 
present the mathematical details of the 
possibility of such a proposal. Given an 
arbitrary group, identifying the right 
subgroup of plain text elements is a 
probability. Eve is not aware of K or has 
very less information about it. This is 
one fact that ensures that Eve may not 
even recognize the right generator on 
solving HSP on the cipher data. One of 
the most important issues concerning the 
security of our proposal is the structure 
of the dynamically generated group G. 
For Eve to gain any relevant information 
on plain text data or K, she has to know 
the structure of G. We assume that G is 
abelian. There are two possible ways of 
computing the structure of the group. 
The first requires that the order of the 
abelian group is known, or that it can be 
computed. The second method does not 
require knowledge of the order of the 
group: the structure is computed from a 
set of generators. In this case, however, 
Eve happens to be ignorant of both 
details. 
 
5. Quantum Encryption: Finite 
Group Construction 
 
           Our proposal requires that the 
order of the group G be dynamically 
fixed by Alice [4, 7, 8]. 
Let O(G) be n. Note that the value of n is 
immaterial to Bob as he reconstructs 
only the right subgroup containing the 
plain text data. We restrict ourselves to 
the construction of generic abelian group 
for the purpose. Note that the entire 
group would constitute the randomizer 
of the plain text data elements. We 
simply construct G and then construct 
compatible subgroup H containing plain 
text elements to be conveyed, with K as 
the generator element of H. 
 
5.1. Construction of a Generic Abelian 
Group 
 A generic abelian group can be 
defined over any domain, universe, or 
aggregate. Alice may define the identity, 
the composition and the inverse 
functions. It is possible to determine if 
the elements of the group will be 
represented internally as a linear 
combination of the generators. To aid in 
the computation of the group, it is also 
possible to set the order and the 
generators of the group. Creating a 
generic abelian group does not imply 
that the group structure will be 
computed, unless this is explicitly 
required. However, structure 
computation will be automatically 
triggered when this is required by the 
nature of the access functions relative to 
the generic group created. Typically, one 
reason for not computing the structure of 
the group is that it may be expensive to 
do so and may actually not be required 
for further operations such as finding the 
order or the discrete logarithm of an 
element of the group.  
 We adopt an algorithmic 
approach to the construction of G. We 
introduce certain parameters for the 
purpose-IdIntrinsic, AddIntrinsic, 
InverseIntrinsic, UseRepresentation, 
Order, UserGenerators, ProperSubset, 
RandomIntrinsic, ComputeStructure.      
 Construct the generic abelian 
group G over the domain U. The domain 
U can be an aggregate (set, indexed set 
or sequence) of elements or it can be any 
structure, for example, an elliptic curve, 
a jacobian, a magma of quadratic forms. 
It can even be a set of unintelligible text 
elements that can distract the structure of 
the plain text elements.  
If the parameters IdIntrinsic, 
AddIntrinsic and InverseIntrinsic are not 
set, then the identity, the composition 
and the inverse function of G are taken 
to be the identity, the composition and 
the inverse function of U or of 
Universe(U) if U is an aggregate. If the 
parameters IdIntrinsic, AddIntrinsic and 
InverseIntrinsic are set, they define the 
identity, the composition and the inverse 
function of G. The parameter IdIntrinsic 
must be a function name whose sole 
argument is U or Universe(U) if U is an 
aggregate. AddIntrinsic must be a 
function name whose only two 
arguments are elements of U or of 
Universe (U) if U is an aggregate. 
InverseIntrinsic must be a function name 
whose only two arguments are elements 
of U or of Universe(U) if U is an 
aggregate. That is, it is required that 
InverseIntrinsic be a binary operation. 
Defining any of the three above 
parameters implies that the other two 
must be defined as well. Setting the 
parameter UseRepresentation to true 
implies that all elements of G will be 
internally represented as linear 
combinations of the generators of G 
obtained while computing the structure 
of G. This can be a costly procedure, 
since such a representation is akin to 
solving the discrete logarithm problem. 
The advantage of such a representation 
is that arithmetic for elements of G as 
well as computing the order of elements 
of G are then essentially trivial 
operations. The value of the parameter 
Order can be set to the order of the 
group, if it is known. This may be useful 
as it removes the need to compute the 
order of the group, should this be 
required by some group structure 
computation, or to solve the discrete 
logarithm problem. More importantly, if 
G is a proper subset of U, or of 
Universe(U) if U is an aggregate, then 
Order must be set, unless the parameter 
UserGenerators is set. One can set 
UserGenerators to some set of elements 
of U, or of Universe(U) if U is an 
aggregate, which generate the group G. 
This can be useful when G is a subset of 
U (Universe(U)), or more generally 
when the computation of the group 
structure of G is made from a set of 
generators. Finally, setting 
UserGenerators may be an alternative to 
setting RandomIntrinsic. The parameter 
ProperSubset must be set when G is a 
proper subset of U (Universe(U)). The 
parameter RandomIntrinsic indicates the 
random function to use. If it is not set, 
the random function (if it is required) is 
taken to be the random function 
applying to U (Universe(U)). The 
parameter RandomIntrinsic must be the 
name of a function taking as its sole 
argument U (Universe(U)) and returning 
an element of U (Universe(U)) which is 
also an element of the group G, which is 
important when G is a proper subset of 
U (Universe(U). Therefore, if G is a 
proper subset of U (Universe(U)), then 
RandomIntrinsic must be set, unless the 
parameter UserGenerators is set. The 
parameter ComputeStructure enables 
Alice to request that the computation of 
the group structure be performed at the 
time of creation. 
 
5.2. Construction of the Subgroup 
 The same dichotomy between 
creation and group structure computation 
as the one discussed for the construction 
of G applies for subgroups of generic 
abelian groups. That is, if H is a 
subgroup of the generic abelian group G, 
then, as a general rule, the structure of H 
is not computed at creation time. There 
are two exceptions to this rule: when 
Alice specifically requests structure 
computation to be performed (via the 
ComputeStructure parameter), and when 
the structure of G is already known and 
H is given in terms of a set of generators 
(in our case, it is just K), or H is a p-
Sylow subgroup of G. Construct the 
subgroup of G generated by the elements 
specified by the terms of the generator 
list L (in this case, it is K). A term L[i] 
of the generator list may consist of any 
of the following objects: an element 
liftable into G; a sequence of integers 
representing an element of G; a set or 
sequence whose elements may be of 
either of the above types.  An element 
liftable into G may be an element of G 
itself, or it may be an element of U 
(Universe(U)), U being as usual the 
domain over which G is defined. The 
subgroup construction must be 
consistent with that of G. 
 In particular, it is possible to 
construct a subgroup by giving its order 
and a random function generating 
elements of the subgroup. Also, where 
the group structure of G is already 
known, or has been computed, and if the 
subgroup is defined in terms of K then 
the subgroup structure is computed at the 
time of creation.  
 
6. Quantum Decryption of 
Authenticated Elements: 
Subgroup Reconstruction and 
Verification 
 
   This approach has its advantage 
in terms of incorporating implicit 
message authentication. The method of 
decryption is simply to reconstruct the 
subgroup with generator K. If G is 
soluble, then most of its subgroups are 
normal. There are efficient results for 
reconstruction of normal subgroups. 
Solving HSP on G can be used to cross 
check the authenticity of the plain text 
elements. A generic quantum algorithm 
for reconstruction [8] would be as 
follows 
 
 Compute  
 
( )∑ ∈Gg gf,g  
 
 and measure the second register f(g).  
 
 
 
The resulting super-position is  
 
( )chfch
Hh
⊗∑ ∈  
 
for some coset cH of H. Furthermore, c 
is uniformly distributed over G. 
 
Compute the Fourier transform of the 
coset state, which is 
 
( ) j,i,ch
H
1
G
d
j,iHhG
ρ






ρ∑∑
∈∈ρ
ρ
 
 
where Gˆ  denotes the set of irreducible 
representations of G. Measure the first 
register and observe a representation on 
ρ .The probability of measuring the 
representation ρ  is proportional to the 
dimension of ρ and number of times ρ  
appears in the induced representation 
IndGH 1H, where 1H denotes the trivial 
representation on H.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Our original group theoretic 
approach opens up new dimensions to 
quantum cryptography, beyond key 
distribution. Most of the theoretic 
assumptions with respect to the relation 
between key K and plain text elements, 
properties of the generated groups and 
reconstruction can be relaxed with the 
advent of efficient solutions to HSP on 
arbitrary groups. We have modeled all 
data as group elements thereby elevating 
them to an abstract plane, beyond type 
and operation specifications. This 
approach will certainly trigger future 
research into quantum algorithms for 
encryption.
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